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Essay 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and Enemy 
Combatants: How Lawmakers Buoyed 
Judicial Supremacy by Placing Limits on 
Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Neal Devinst 
By turning a statute limiting court jurisdiction into a dele-
gation of power by Congress to the Supreme Court, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld1 is a political masterstroke. In the pages that follow, 
I explain why "the least dangerous branch" felt empowered to 
ignore congressional limits on its authority, repudiate 
presidentially created military tribunals, and conclude that the 
Geneva Convention applies to Guanbinamo detainees. In so do-
ing, I will use the Court's Hamdan ruling to extend my contri-
bution to last year's Minnesota Law Review Symposium on the 
future of the Supreme Court. In that Essay, Should the Su-
preme Court Fear Congress?, I examined recent proposals to 
strip court jurisdiction on divisive social issues and concluded 
that the Supreme Court has little reason to fear a backlash 
from Congress.2 For identical reasons, the Hamdan Court had 
no reason to fear Congress. Congress never challenged judicial 
independence when it enacted legislation limiting federal court 
jurisdiction over enemy combatants. In making this point, I will 
look at the politics both surrounding the 2005 Detainee Treat-
t Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of 
William and Mary. Thanks to the Minnesota Law Review for encouraging me 
to write a follow up to Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1337 (2006). Thanks also to my able research assistants, Svetlana 
Khvalina, John Miller, and Allison Sawyer. Thanks, finally, to Lou Fisher and 
Jeff Powell for commenting on an earlier version of this Essay. Copyright 
© 2007 by Neal Devins. 
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
2. Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. 
REV. 1337, 1361-62 (2006). 
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ment Act (limiting court power over Guantanamo detainees)3 
and the 2006 Military Commissions Act (forbidding habeas fil-
ings by enemy combatants).4 
This Essay does not address whether the Hamdan decision 
is correct on the merits. It may be that lawless hubris animated 
the Court's refusal to defer to executive branch interpretations 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other relevant stat-
utes.s That animation, however, is not my concern. Instead, I 
will look at Hamdan as a work of political strategy-examining 
why the Court would have incentive to see Bush administration 
initiatives as executive overreaching and, similarly, why the 
Court would want to see Congress as its ally. 
My essay proceeds in two parts. First, I examine congres-
sional efforts to restrict court jurisdiction over Guantanamo de-
tainees. Specifically, I explain why Congress never saw these 
statutes as challenging the Court's power to decide the enemy 
combatant issue. More generally, I argue that Congress has no 
interest in challenging the Court to a knock-down fight . Sec-
ond, I discuss Hamdan, focusing on the Court's assessment of 
how Congress and the Court should interface with each other. 
In particular, I highlight the reasons why the Court would 
want to protect (if not expand) its institutional turf and, in so 
doing, limit the executive. 
I. CONGRESS AND THE COURT 
A. BACKGROUND 
A trio of June 2004 cases set into motion the Court-
Congress dialogue that produced statutory restrictions on court 
jurisdiction both before and after Hamdan. The most conse-
quential of these cases is Rasul v. Bush, a decision rejecting 
Bush administration efforts to block federal court review of ha-
beas claims filed by Guantanamo detainees.6 The Bush admini-
3. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 
119 Stat. 2739. 
4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600. 
5. For a condemnation of Hamdan, see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan 
v. Ruinsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Execu-
tive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 101 (2006) . For a celebration of the deci-
sion, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes 
to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006). 
6. 542 u.s. 466, 481 (2004). 
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stration argued that habeas relief was inappropriate because 
the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo is under Cuban, not U.S., 
sovereignty.7 In rejecting that argument,s the Supreme Court 
signaled its willingness to police the administration's handling 
of enemy combatants. At the same time, the Court ruled 
against the government in another case involving U.S. citizens 
detained on terrorism charges.9 Rejecting the government's 
claim that it can detain captured al Qaeda members and Tali-
ban indefinitely, the Court ruled that the Constitution "most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individ-
ual liberties are at stake" and that enemy combatants must 
have access to a lawyer and a "fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision 
maker."10 
The results and rhetoric of these cases represent a signifi-
cant break from past practice. In the fifty years since the Court 
rejected President Truman's seizure of the steel mills in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,n the Court regularly 
acquiesced to presidential war-making initiatives.l2 In its 2004 
rulings, however, the Court flatly rejected the government's po-
sition that separation of powers principles "mandate a heavily 
circumscribed role for the courts."l3 A state of war, as Justice 
O'Connor put it, "is not a blank check for the President when it 
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."14 
7. Id. at 475-76. 
8. Id. at 480-81. The Supreme Court determined that the district court 
needed jurisdiction over the detainee's custodian to reach the detainee, regard-
less of the detainee's citizenship or location. In this case, the ultimate custo-
dian was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. I d. at 4 78-83. 
9. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). A third case, Rums-
feld v. Padilla also raised the question of whether the President had the power 
to detain a U .S. citizen militarily. 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) . The Court, ruling 
5:4, concluded that Padilla had filed his action in the wrong court. Id. 
10. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 536. In her Hamdi opinion, Justice O'Connor 
suggested that a wholly executive body, including one made of military offi-
cers, could satisfy her demand for a "neutral decisonmaker." See id. at 532-35. 
11. 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). 
12. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 272-74 (2d ed. 2004); 
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 
CONST. COMMENT. 63, 75-83 (2002); Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War 
Power, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 466, 484-88 (2005). 
13. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. 
14. Id. at 536. 
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Five interrelated phenomena-most of which were also at 
play in Hamdan-fueled the Court's rulings in these cases.15 
First, the Rehnquist Court worked hard to protect its turf. In 
other contexts, rather than shying away from political battles, 
the Court has embraced the rhetoric of judicial supremacy.1s 
Contending that Congress must adhere to the Court's interpre-
tations of the Constitution, for example, the Justices rejected 
congressional efforts to mandate state accommodations for reli-
gious minorities17 and the disabled.lS Second, the Bush admini-
stration staked out an extreme position in these cases (and re-
lated war on terror initiatives).19 By arguing that the president 
has final and unreviewable authority over military detainees 
held outside this country, the administration claimed that it 
could do with Guantanamo detainees as it saw fit. Echoing the 
Truman administration's claim in Youngstown that the only 
checks on presidential excess were "the ballot box and ... im-
peachment,"20 the administration tried to back the Court into a 
corner. 
Third, administration efforts to assuage the Court at oral 
arguments backfired. Contending that the "last thing you want 
to do is torture somebody or try to do something along those 
lines,"21 the administration argued that it could be trusted. The 
very day the Court heard oral arguments, however, the media 
released photographs of U.S. soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners 
at Abu Ghraib prison.22 Making matters worse, the press sub-
sequently revealed that the Justice Department had crafted a 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism 
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2036-37 (2003); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The 
Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Ju-
risprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1969 (2006). For additional discussion, see 
infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text. 
17. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997). 
18. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
19. Linda Greenhouse, Detention Cases Before Supreme Court Will Test 
Limits of Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (suggesting 
that the administration weakened its legal position by taking extreme posi-
tions on presidential power). 
20. Devins & Fisher, supra note 12, at 6S-69 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 82-
534, at 371 (1952)). For additional discussion linking Hamdan to Youngstown, 
see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. 
21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004) (No. 03-6696). 
22. See Charles Lane, Iraqi Prison Abuse May Hurt Administration in 
Court, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A22. 
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legal justification to use torture during the interrogation of sus-
pected terrorists and that U.S. military officers in Iraq modeled 
their interrogation procedures after tactics used at 
Guantanamo.23 Fourth, the Court had little reason to fear a 
backlash from Congress. The prison scandal and torture memo 
came at a political cost to the White House, weakening the ad-
ministration's in Congress and with the American people.24 
Fifth, there was little risk of executive non-acquiescence. In 
ruling against the administration, the Court did not compel an 
overhaul of administration policies. While signaling that the 
Court would play some role in checking the executive and that 
the government must give enemy combatants an opportunity to 
challenge their detention, the decisions did not place hard lim-
its on the executive.25 
Congress had next to nothing to say about the Court's rul-
ings. In the days following the Guantanamo habeas decisions, 
no lawmaker spoke on the House or Senate floor about there-
sults and only a handful issued press releases about the cas-
es.26 In part, lawmaker silence reflects the modern Congress's 
practice of treating Supreme Court decisions as final and de-
finitive (a topic I will return to in a few pages).27 More than 
that, Abu Ghraib, the torture memo, and the President's 
slumping job-approval ratings made congressional discussion of 
. the Court beside the point. Lawmakers instead focused their 
energies on an intramural squabble over the President's han-
23. See Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture 
Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June.8, 2004, at Al; Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8, 
2004, at Al. 
24. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Starts Out on a Five-Week Run Con-
cerning Iraq, Much of It Apparently Uphill, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at Al4. 
25. For this reason, pro-executive lawyers were able to characterize the 
trio of rulings as a "significant reaffirmation of the President's constitutional 
authority as commander in chief in time of war." David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. 
Casey, Bush's Good Day in Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at A19. For a 
discussion of how the Bush administration attempted to use these decisions to 
its advantage, see LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER 220-52 (2005). 
26. See Guantanamo Press Release, Congresswoman Jane Harman, Har-
man Welcomes Decision by Supreme Court to Provide Detainees with Access 
to Courts and Counsel (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
harman/press/releases/2004/062804PR_SupremeCourt.html; Press Release, 
Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch on Guantanamo Bay Supreme Court Decision 
(June 28, 2004), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1090. 
27. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
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dling of the war on terror. Democrats pushed for greater over-
sight while Republicans sought to minimize the political dam-
age of these scandals. 
For its part, the Bush administration tried to make lemon-
ade from the lemon the Supreme Court handed it. The Justice 
Department press release did not mention that the Court re-
jected the administration's arguments.2s Instead, the Depart-
ment emphasized that the Court's decision validated the Presi-
dent's power to detain enemy combatants and that the Court 
tempered its demand that enemy combatants be afforded pro-
cedural protections by recognizing that these protections "must 
reflect the unique context of the detention ... and the need of 
the executive to prosecute the war."29 Two weeks later, the ad-
ministration put some of its new policies into place. Most sig-
nificant, in anticipation of using military commissions to try 
enemy combatants, it created Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nals to determine whether detainees were lawful soldiers or 
unlawful enemy combatants.30 The administration also sought 
to limit judicial review of its decisions through favorable inter-
pretations of the Geneva Convention and other treaties.31 
It did not take long for things to change. Within six months 
of the Court's decisions, the District Court of the District of Co-
lumbia rejected the Bush administration's decision to use mili-
tary commissions that operated outside the court martial pro-
cedures contemplated by the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.32 That decision was overturned by the D.C. Circuit in 
July 2005.33 When the Supreme Court agreed to review this de-
cision on November 7, 2005,34 Congress got into the act. 
Just three days after the Court granted certiorari, Con-
gress appeared ready to go for the Court's jugular. On Novem-
28. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo; Dir. of 
Pub. Affairs, Regarding the Enemy Combatant Cases (June 28, 2004), avail· 
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/June/04_opa_ 455.htm. 
29. !d. 
30. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y 
of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
31. SeeR. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH. 
POST, July 4, 2004, at A12. 
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 168--70 (D.D.C. 2004), 
rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
33. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 44. 
34. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 622-23. 
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ber 10, the Senate approved, by a 49:42 vote,35legislation deny-
ing jurisdiction to any "court, justice, or judge" to consider a 
habeas petition brought by a Guantanamo detainee.36 The leg-
islation, moreover,·applied both prospectively and retroactively 
to any case "pending on or after the· date of the enactment of 
this Act."37 And while the amendment allowed the D.C. Circuit 
to review whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunal fol-
lowed its own procedures, there is no doubt that this amend-
ment was both a rebuke of the Court's Rasul decision and a 
clear attempt to short-circuit the Hamdan litigation. Most no-
tably, bill sponsor Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) took direct 
aim at Rasul, arguing that enemy combatants should not have 
meaningful access to civilian courts.ss 
Three days later, however, the Graham amendment was 
modified in a deal brokered by a bipartisan group of Senators.39 
The new version of the bill changed the effective date provision 
(eliminating any explicit reference to "pending'' cases), granted 
automatic appeals to any detainee sentenced by a military 
commission to death or at least ten years of prison, and for-
mally linked the bill to efforts by Senator John McCain (R-
Ariz.) to ban torture and abuse of terrorism suspects held in 
U.S. facilities. 40 This bill, enacted as the Detainee Treatment 
Act (DTA), was approved by a vote of 84:14.41 
Two weeks after the President signed the bill, the Justice 
Department asked the Supreme Court to dismiss Hamdan. 42 
35. 151 CONG. REC. S12,667-68 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005). 
36. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3477. 
37. § 1405, 119 Stat. at 3479. 
38. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1; Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham, 
Senate Passes Graham Detainee Plan (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http:// 
lgraham.senate. gov/index.cfm ?mode=presspage&id=248690. 
39. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 
119 Stat. 2739, 2739-44. 
40. See Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at Al. 
41. 151 CONG. REC. S12,803 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005). 
42. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). The Justice Department motion 
adhered to comments made by President Bush. When signing the DTA, the 
President claimed that the bill applied retroactively and that "the executive 
branch shall construe [the DTA] to preclude the Federal courts from exercising 
subject matter jurisdiction over any existing or future action, including appli-
cations for writs of habeas corpus." Press Release, President George W. Bush, 
President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, 
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Pointing to statutory language that "no court, justice, or judge 
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider" any action filed by a 
Guantanamo detainee, the government argued that the DTA 
"clearly evinces Congress's intent" both to respond to Rasul and 
to "strictly ... limit the judicial review available to aliens de-
tained at Guantanamo."43 
The Supreme Court was not fazed by the DTA or the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss. It deferred consideration of the is-
sue until it heard oral arguments in Hamdan.44 And when the 
Court decided Hamdan in June 2006, the Court ruled five to 
three that the DTA did not apply retroactively to Hamdan's ha-
beas petition. 45 The Court then turned to the merits, ruling 
that the Bush administration needed explicit congressional au-
thorization before it could constitute military commissions.46 
The Court also concluded that, until Congress said otherwise, 
the Geneva Conventions apply to Guantanamo detainees and 
the Conventions are enforceable in federal court.47 
Over the next three months, Congress and the Bush ad-
ministration crafted a legislative response to Hamdan. Ap-
proved by Congress in September 2006, the Military Commis-
sions Act (MCA) both authorizes military commission trials of 
enemy combatants and prohibits federal court consideration of 
habeas petitions filed by detainees. 48 Also, while placing limits 
on CIA interrogation techniques and declaring the United 
States obligated to abide by existing treaty obligations, the 
MCA gives the administration substantial leeway to sort out 
how to apply the Geneva Conventions and other treaties.49 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html. 
43. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note 
42, at 8-9, 20. 
44. See United States Supreme Court, Docket for 05-184, http://www 
.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-184.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764-69. 
46. Id. at 2774-81. 
47. Id. at 2793-96. 
48. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600. Under the MCA, moreover, enemy combatant status extends both to 
Guantanamo detainees (who had been found to be "unlawful enemy combat· 
ants") and to anyone who has "purposefully and materially" supported hostil· 
ity against the United States (including people who provided support off the 
battlefield). Id. § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601. 
49. See Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at Al. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
Against this backdrop, how can I argue that Congress did 
not see its jurisdiction stripping statutes as rebukes to the 
Court? Mter all, Congress enacted the DTA only weeks after 
the Court granted certiorari in Hamdan, and the MCA followed 
in the immediate wake of the Court's decision. Congress, in 
other words, made clear that it wanted to circumscribe judicial 
review of claims by enemy combatants-both in anticipation of 
and in response to the Court's Hamdan decision. At the same 
time, for reasons I will now detail, Congress never saw its 
handiwork as challenging the Court's power to sort out the le-
gality of presidentially created military commissions, the appli-
cability of the Geneva Convention to Guantanamo detainees, 
and the availability of habeas corpus relief to enemy combat-
ants. For this very reason, Congress did not question Hamdan's 
rulings on military commissions and the Geneva Convention.5o 
Likewise, Congress would be quite accepting of a Court decision 
invalidating MCA provisions prohibiting federal court consid-
eration of habeas corpus filings by Guantanamo detainees. 
To start, Congress did not intend the DTA to short-circuit 
Supreme Court review in Hamdan. Even though congressional 
debates began three days after the grant of certiorari, the bill 
had been filed before the Court's decision to hear the case.51 
Even more, Congress ultimately deleted language in the origi-
nal bill precluding federal court review of pending cases. 52 And 
while lawmakers did not explicitly embrace Supreme Court re-
view of pending challenges (like Hamdan's), no supporter of the 
bill challenged bill cosponsor Carl Levin's (D-Mich.) claim that 
the bill "would apply only to new habeas cases filed after the 
date of enactment."53 Some opponents of the bill argued that 
their opposition to the measure was tied to their belief that the 
bill would apply retroactively and, consequently, prevent the 
Supreme Court from assessing the legality of military tribunals 
50. Some lawmakers, of course, were deeply disappointed by Hamdan . 
But these lawmakers-even those who might have resented what the Court 
did--did not challenge the Court. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying 
text. 
51. See 151 CONG. REC. S14,263-U4 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (noting that the amendment was introduced before the grant of cer-
tiorari and, consequently, that it is "hard to argue that the amendment was 
motivated by a desire to strip the court of its jurisdiction in [Hamdan]") . 
52. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
53. 151 CONG. REC. S12,802 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Levin); id. at S12, 754-55 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005). 
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in Hamdan.54 Indeed, the fact that eighty-four Senators voted 
for the amended bill provides strong evidence that the Senate 
did not intend to foreclose Supreme Court review in Hamdan. 
None of this is to say that Congress formally embraced Su-
preme Court consideration of niill.tary tribunals in Hamdan. 
The statutory language is silent on that question.55 Further-
more, even though the bill's other cosponsors (Lindsey Graham 
and John Kyl (R-Ariz.)) never responded to Senator Levin,56 
they both made clear that they wanted their bill to block the 
Hamdan litigation. Minutes before the Senate gave final ap-
proval to the bill, they inserted into the Congressional Record a 
colloquy stating their belief that the bill should apply retroac-
tively.57 Graham and Kyl also filed an amicus brief in Hamdan, 
arguing that the DTA should be applied retroactively.58 Never-
theless, the insertion of a conversation that never took place 
into the Congressional Record seems an end run-hardly the 
stuff to convince a Supreme Court Justice (or anyone) that 
Congress intended to snuff out Supreme Court review in Ham-
dan. 59 Put another way: whether or not the Congress wanted 
54. See Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 17, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) 
[hereinafter Kyl and Graham Amicus Brief] (listing Senators who commented 
that the amendment would strip the Court of jurisdiction). 
55. The majority and dissenting opinions in Hamdan endorsed competing, 
diametrically opposed approaches to the statutory interpretation question-
the majority concluding that jurisdiction should be preserved unless Congress 
says otherwise, the dissent arguing that the plain language of the statute e-
liminated jurisdiction. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 n.15, 2810; see also infra 
notes 137-38 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the difference in ap-
proaches). 
56. This lack of response is particularly noteworthy because Graham 
spoke immediately after Levin on two of the three occasions in which Levin 
contended that the Act was prospective in application. See 151 CONG. REC. 
S12,802 (Nov. 15, 2005); 151 CONG. REC. S12,754-56 (Nov. 14, 2005); 151 
CONG. REC. S12,664 (Nov. 10, 2005). 
57. 151 CONG. REC. S14,260-68 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005). 
58. See Kyl and Graham Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 9-22; Dan Eg-
gen, Record Shows Senators' 'Debate' That Wasn't, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, 
at A6 (noting that the colloquy never took place, notwithstanding efforts by 
Graham and Kyl to contend in their amicus brief that comments in the Con-
gressional Record are "presumed to reflect live debate except when the state-
ments therein are followed by a bullet ... or are underlined"). 
59. In suggesting that a Justice might discount the Graham-Kyl colloquy, 
I am not arguing that the Court should look to lawmaker comments when 
sorting out the meaning of statutory language. My point, instead, is that the 
failure of Senators Graham and Kyl to rebut Senator Levin (the third cospon-
sor of the amendment-and the cosponsor who pushed for the deletion of the 
language establishing retroactivity) suggests that those lawmakers who fa-
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the Supreme Court to decide the fate of military tribunals in 
Hamdan, it is almost certain that Congress understood that the 
Court might ultimately make that decision. 
Beyond removing language governing the retroactive ap-
plication of the bill, Congress modified the DTA in ways that 
make clear that it did not see the bill as a rebuke to the courts. 
For example, by providing for D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court 
review of military commission sentences exceeding ten years,6o 
lawmakers intended to preserve independent judicial review of 
significant military commission verdicts. Correspondingly, 
lawmakers depicted the bill as both recognizing the need for 
"federal court oversight" of military operations and advancing 
military effectiveness by allowing the military to prosecute the 
war on terror without being unduly burdened by frivolous law-
suits.61 Senator Graham echoed these remarks, noting. that the 
DTA prevented "lawsuit abuse" by prohibiting habeas filings62 
while, at the same time, conceding that the original bill was 
"flawed" because it did not allow for court review of military 
commission appeals.63 
In other significant ways, lawmakers made clear that they 
did not see the DTA as an attack on either the Court or an in-
dependent judiciary. Lawmakers depicted themselves as work-
vored retroactive application of the statute did not feel that they could success-
fully fight this fight on the Senate floor. For a Justice interested in sorting out 
whether the Court's assertion of jurisdiction in Hamdan might provoke a con-
gressional backlash, the failure of Senators Graham and Kyl to fight this fight 
is telling. 
60. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 
Stat. 2680, 2742 ("[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of a Com-
batant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy 
combatant."). The statute did not explicitly mention Supreme Court review of 
the D.C. Circuit judgments. However, the sponsors of the Act, Lindsey Gra-
ham and John Kyl, made it clear that they anticipated judicial review. See 151 
CONG. REC. S14,268 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl); id. at 
S12,801 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). Senator Arlen 
Specter (R-P.A.) provided a competing perspective. See id. at S12,801 (state-
ment of Sen. Specter) ("[The amendment] means what it says-the Supreme 
Court has no jurisdiction."). 
61. See 151 CONG. REC. S12,754-55 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Levin). 
62. ld. at S12, 755 (statement of Sen. Graham). 
63. Id. at S12,754. Even Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), who voted 
against the bill, recognized that, after Rasul, "the present level of accessibility 
to our courts by individuals who would do us harm is unprecedented in our 
nation's history." Id. at S14,271 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Clinton). 
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ing collegially with the Court; several Senators, for example, 
contended that the "Supreme Court has been shouting to us in 
Congress: Get involved," and thereby depicted Rasul as a "chal-
lenge" to Congress, 64 "asking the Senate and the House, do you 
intend for ... enemy' combatants ... to challenge their deten-
tion [in federal courts] as if they were American citizens?"65 
Lawmakers also spoke of detainee habeas petitions as an 
"abuse"66 of the federal courts, and warned that such petitions 
might unduly clog the courts, 67 thus "swamping the system"68 
with "frivolous" complaints.69 Under this view, the DTA's cabin-
ing of federal court jurisdiction "respects" the Court's inde-
pendence and its role in the detainee process. 70 
Not all lawmakers saw the DTA as a model of Court-
Congress cooperation. Opponents of the bill depicted the meas-
ure as undermining the rule of law and unduly limiting the 
courts' jurisdiction.71 With that said, it is telling that support-
ers of the measure both embraced judicial independence and 
claimed to follow the Court's instructions in Rasul. Correspond-
ingly, by removing the retroactivity provision from the DTA, 
lawmakers signaled to the Supreme Court that it could (with-
out risking a legislative backlash) use Hamdan to invalidate 
the Bush administration's military commission initiative. 
Congress's response to Hamdan backs up these claims, 
notwithstanding the fact that the MCA eliminates the federal 
64. I d. at S12, 753 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
65. Id. at S12,732; see also id. at S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (state-
ment of Sen. Specter) ("The Supreme Court finally took the bull by the horns 
... because the Congress had not acted."); id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting 
that Rasul was a statutory ruling and, consequently, that Congress could clar-
ify its intent without contradicting the Court). Senators similarly character-
ized Justice O'Connor's Hamdi opinion as an invitation for Congress to narrow 
detainee rights legislatively. See id. at S12,656 (statement of Sen. Graham). 
66. See id. at S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Gra-
ham). 
67. See id. at S12,659 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
68. See id. at S12,732 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Gra-
ham). 
69. See id. at S14,262 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005) (statement of Sen. Gra-
ham) (arguing that his amendment was designed to prevent detainees from 
abusing the federal courts by flooding them with frivolous lawsuits). 
70. See id. at S14,263 (statement of Sen. Graham) ("[W]e wanted to re-
spect the courts' role .... "). 
71. See id. at S14,271 (statement of Sen. Clinton); id. at S12,803 (daily ed. 
Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("[H]abeas corpus protects all of us-it 
is the way we ensure that the Executive Branch acts within the bounds of the 
law."). 
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courts' jurisdiction over enemy combatants' habeas corpus peti-
tions. To start, lawmakers did not challenge the Court's ruling 
in Hamdan. Republicans who were instrumental in passing the 
DTA depicted Hamdan as a rallying call for Congress "to do our 
job, to clarify the law."72 Representative Duncan Hunter (R-
Cal.), who introduced the legislation on the House floor, said 
during the debates that the bill was a response to the "mandate 
of the Supreme Court that Congress involve itself in producing 
this new structure to prosecute terrorists."73 And DTA sponsor 
Lindsey Graham stated: "The Supreme Court has set the rules 
of the road and the Congress and the president can drive to the 
destination together."74 Even lawmakers who expressed disap-
pointment in the Court's ruling did not criticize the Court. 
Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.), for example, blamed Hamdan's 
lawyers for misleading the Court about the legislative history 
of the DT A. 75 
Needless to say, Democratic opponents of the DTA cele-
brated Hamdan as a "triumph for the rule of law"76 and our 
system of "checks and balances," where Congress has a vital 
role in defining detainee rights. 77 For his part, President Bush 
promised to "protect the people and, at the same time, conform 
with the findings of the Supreme Court."78 White House Press 
Secretary Tony Snow echoed the President's comments at a 
press briefing. Snow remarked that the President will "figure 
72. Press Release, Senator Jim lnhofe, Inhofe Statement on Terrorist· 
Detainee Treatment Bill, CONG. Q. (Sept. 15, 2006). 
73. 152 CONG. REC. H7535 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Hunter). 
74. David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court's Ruling Is Likely to Force Ne-
gotiations over Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A21; see also 
Congressional Hearings on Guantanamo Set, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-30-gitmo-hearings_x.htm 
(quoting Senator John McCain as saying, "I'm confident that we can come up 
with a framework that guarantees we comply with the Court's order"). 
75. See 152 CONG. REC. 810,404 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Cornyn). 
76. Rep. Pelosi Responds to Supreme Court Decision on Guantcinamo Mili-
tary Commissions, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
11334427. 
77. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Reaction to Supreme Court's 
Decision in Hamdan Case (June 29, 2006), http://leahy.senate.gov/press/ 
200606/062906.html; Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Statement on the Su-
preme Court's Decision in the Case of Hamdan v. United States, CONG. Q. 
(June 29, 2006). 
78. The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Junichiro Koi-
zumi of Japan, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1242, 1244 (June 29, 2006). 
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out precisely what the Court is saying here, and how to proceed 
in a way that comports with it."79 Furthermore, Snow stated 
that it is "now the obligation of the administration ... to exe-
cute laws that are consistent with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing."so 
When crafting the MCA, lawmakers uniformly agreed that 
"whatever the Congress does, the legislation [it] produce[s] 
must be able to withstand further security review and scrutiny 
of the federal court system, particularly the Supreme Court."81 
For Representative Susan Davis (D-Cal.), fidelity to the Court's 
understanding of the Constitution was especially important be-
cause the Court in Hamdan "entrusted this Congress with the 
duty to reform military tribunals in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution and international treaty obligations."S2 At the 
same time, most lawmakers treated Hamdan as simply a call 
for Congress to set policy in this area-to formally authorize 
military commissions and to place constraints on the operation 
of those commissions. Under this view, lawmakers went about 
balancing the Geneva Conventions, habeas corpus filings, judi-
cial review, and executive branch discretion. Their solution was 
a bill that authorized military commissions, limited interroga-
tion techniques, embraced the Geneva Conventions (while giv-
ing the executive branch discretion in interpreting the Conven-
tions), allowed judicial review of Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal determinations that an individual was an enemy 
combatant, permitted judicial review of commission judgments, 
and prohibited federal court consideration of habeas filings by 
enemy combatants. 83 
79. Press Briefing by Tony Snow, White House Press Sec'y (June 29, 
2006), http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060629-6.html. 
80. See id. Two weeks after the Court's decision, the President extended 
basic Geneva Convention protections to Guantanamo detainees. See Scott 
Shane, Terror and Presidential Power: Bush Takes a Step Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 12, 2006, at A20. The administration later retreated from this position. 
See Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress to Curb the Rights of De-
tainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1 (discussing the Bush administra-
tion's changed position, especially its decision to urge Congress to "narrowly 
define the rights granted to detainees" under Common Article Three of the 
Geneva Conventions). 
81. 152 CONG. REC. S10,245-46 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Warner). 
82. 152 CONG. REC. H7944 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Davis). 
83. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 948b, 948r, 
120 Stat. 2600, 2602, 2607, 2637. For discussion of the compromise reached on 
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In eliminating habeas filings,B4 Congress did not intend to 
pick a knock-down fight with the courts. Just as the DTA rec-
ognized an important judicial role while eliminating habeas fil-
ings,B5 the MCA likewise was premised on the view that habeas 
filings both clogged the courts and "hampered the war effort."B6 
Debates over the MCA habeas provision, moreover, reveal that 
lawmakers thought that the Supreme Court was responsible 
for ultimately determining the meaning of habeas protections.B7 
Specifically, lawmakers argued that they were operating within 
the bill, see Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves De· 
tainee Bill Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at Al. See also John 
W. Warner et al., Look Past the Tortured Distortions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 
2006, at AlO (explaining the key provisions of the MCA as understood by the 
bill's architects). For news stories detailing political battles between the White 
House and Senate Republicans as well as squabbles between Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress, see Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P 
Upbeat on Terror- Trial Bill: House Leaders Satisfied with Bush-Senate Com-
promise, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2006, at A6; Carl Hulse et al., How 3 G.O.P. 
Veterans Stalled Bush Detainee Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, sec. 1, at 1; 
Jonathan Weisman & Peter Baker, White House Offers New Proposal on Inter-
rogations, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2006, at A4; Kate Zernike, Lawyers and 
G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Tribunal Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al. 
84. Unlike the DTA (which limited federal court review of sentences ex-
ceeding ten years), the MCA authorizes federal court review of all sentences. 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d, 120 Stat. 
2600, 2603. Nonetheless, enemy combatants are not entitled to a trial de novo 
and, consequently, federal appellate courts must rely on a record which may 
include hearsay evidence as well as evidence obtained through aggressive in-
terrogation techniques. See id. § 949a, 120 Stat. at 2608; Julian E. Barnes & 
Richard B. Schmitt, Tribunal Bill Sets Up an Ironic Legal Limbo, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2006, at A14. The law, moreover, does not address whether limits on 
the executive's power to hold enemy combatants are necessary. In this way, 
the law places no limits on the power of government to hold enemy combatants 
indefinitely. See 152 CONG. REC. S10,262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (letter from 
John Hutson et al. to Senator Warner and Senator Levin) (noting that high-
ranking al Qaeda members may enjoy more procedural protections through 
military commission trials than low-level suspects who have never been 
charged). In its 2004 rulings and again in Hamdan, the Supreme Court like-
wise placed no limits on the government's power to hold enemy combatants. 
See Rivkin & Casey, supra note 25 (noting that Hamdi and Padilla "mark a 
significant reaffirmation of the President's constitutional authority as com-
mander in chief in a time of war"). 
85. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. 
86. Neil A. Lewis & Kate Zerinke, Measures Seek to Restrict Detainees' 
Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at A22 (quoting Senator Lindsey 
Graham). 
87. For an insightful accounting of the MCA habeas provision focusing on 
Republican Party politics, see Jeffrey Toobin, Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW 
YORKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 46. 
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parameters set by the Court and, if not, that the Court could 
eviscerate the MCA's habeas provision. 
Fifty-one Senators voted against a proposed amendment to 
provide habeas protections to Guantanamo detainees. 88 These 
lawmakers (50 Republicans and 1 Democrat) argued that the 
Constitution did not afford habeas protections to enemy com-
batants.89 In other words, enemy combatants were only entitled 
to habeas protections afforded to them by Congress-statutory 
rights that Congress could modify as it saw fit.90 Lawmakers 
backed up this claim by citing Supreme Court decisions.91 No 
supporter of the statute argued that Congress was challenging 
the Court by stripping the Court's jurisdiction to hear constitu-
tionally guaranteed habeas claims. Congress simply followed 
Hamdan's directive by stating its policy preferences. Specifi-
cally, if the Supreme Court were to conclude, in a challenge to 
the MCA, that enemy combatants possessed constitutional ha-
beas rights, the Court could neuter that statutory provision 
without invalidating the statute on constitutional grounds. For 
instance, the Court could conclude that Congress sought only to 
nullify statutory habeas rights-so that the MCA did not seek 
to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear constitutionally guar-
anteed habeas claims. 92 
Forty-eight Senators (43 Democrats, 4 Republicans, and 1 
Independent) supported the habeas amendment.93 These Sena-
88. 152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006). 
89. The Senate debate took place on September 27 and 28, 2006. See id. at 
S10,354-69 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006); id. at S10,263-74 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 
2006). 
90. One of the principal architects of the MCA, Senator Graham, stated: 
"It is a statutory right of habeas that has been granted to enemy combatants. 
And if there is a constitutional right of habeas corpus given to enemy combat-
ants, that is a totally different endeavor, and it would change in many ways 
what I have said." 151 CONG. REC. S10,267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (state-
ment of Sen. Graham). 
91. See id. at S10,268 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(proposing that aliens held at home or abroad do not have authority to invoke 
the Constitution (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950))). 
92. Statements made by Senator Graham and others make clear that 
lawmakers intended to eliminate only statutory habeas corpus rights. See 152 
CONG. REC. S10,267 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Graham); id. 
at S10,265 (statement of Sen. Warner) (arguing that Supreme Court prece-
dents establish statutory, not constitutional, habeas rights for enemy combat-
ants); id. at S10,267 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (refuting the argument that en-
emy combatants maintain a "constitutional right to habeas"). 
93. 152 CONG. REC. S10,369 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006). 
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tors argued that enemy combatants possessed constitutional 
habeas rights, that Congress could not constitutionally strip 
the courts of jurisdiction, and that the courts would strike down 
the language limiting the courts' jurisdiction.s4 Lawmakers also 
spoke about the need for Congress and the courts to check ex-
ecutive branch excess, including a military commission system 
that puts the President in charge of enemy combatant trials. 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), for example, said that the ha-
beas provision "will remove the checks in our legal system that 
provide against arbitrarily detaining people for life without 
charge."95 These lawmakers hope and expect that the Court 
will invalidate the MCA language prohibiting judicial consid-
eration of habeas claims. 
In summary, legislation that strips the courts of habeas ju-
risdiction in enemy combatant cases is anything but a rebuke 
to the Court's rulings in Rasul and Hamdan. Lawmakers did 
not criticize the Court for these rulings. Rather, when enacting 
the MCA, lawmakers claimed that they were following Court 
interpretations of the Constitution by codifying the provisions 
of the Hamdan decision while respecting the Court's habeas 
corpus jurisprudence. Lawmakers likewise recognized that the 
Court would pass judgment on their handiwork and that they 
would support a Court ruling that nullified the habeas corpus 
provision of the MCA,96 just as they backed the Court's inter-
pretation of the DTA in Hamdan.97 Finally, when enacting the 
DTA, lawmakers signaled the Supreme Court that they would 
94. 151 CONG. REC. S10,356--57 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy) (describing the provision as inconsistent with two hundred years 
of jurisprudence and "a betrayal of the most basic values of freedom for which 
America stands"); id. at S10,366 (statement of Sen. Levin) (noting that the 
courts will strike down court-stripping legislation and arguing that Congress 
therefore must fulfill its responsibility to protect "that great writ of habeas 
corpus which is in the Constitution"); id. at S10,367 (statement of Sen. Spec-
ter) ("[T]he Constitution is explicit in the statement that habeas corpus may 
be suspended only with rebellion or invasion .... We do not have a rebellion 
or invasion."). 
95. 152 CONG. REC. S10,357 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). Senator Leahy also asked for unanimous consent to have printed in 
the Record a letter from more than sixty law school deans and professors who 
"state that the Congress would gravely disserve our global reputation by [abol-
ishing habeas corpus]." ld. (letter from law school deans and professors to U.S. 
Senators and members of Congress) ("[T]he [MCA] ignores the importance of 
shared institutional powers and checks and balances in crafting lawful and 
sustainable responses to the war on terror."). 
96. See supra notes 82-95. 
97. See supra notes 72-80. 
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support a Court ruling invalidating the President's military 
commission initiative. 
* * * 
Legislative consideration of the DTA and the MCA reveal 
that Congress accepts the Court's power to define the Constitu-
tion's meaning and invalidate or limit federal statutes. The fact 
that these bills restrict federal court jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo detainee filings reflects Congress's policy prefer-
ences, not Congress's attitudes about the Supreme Court. Spe-
cifically, lawmakers look to the courts to settle constitutional 
questions. Indeed, the legislative debates surrounding jurisdic-
tion-limiting bills-like the DTA and the MCA-acquiesce to 
the courts' power to say what the law is.98 
Unlike the Warren Court era, when legislative proposals 
reflected intense lawmaker disapproval of Supreme Court deci-
sions, today's Congress is not interested in challenging the 
Court.99 For example, Congress acquiesced to a spate of 
Rehnquist Court rulings that invalidated all or part of thirty-
one federal statutes.10o Congress did not care that the Court 
both depicted itself as the supreme expositor of the Constitu-
tion and invalidated more federal statutes than any of its pre-
decessor Courts. Likewise, lawmakers did not object to the 
Court's reinvigoration of federalism constraints on Congress,lOl 
Rather, lawmakers treated the Court's rulings as final and au-
thoritative. Lawmakers did not hold hearings on the rulings, 
they entered virtually no comments about the rulings in the 
Congressional Record, and their legislative responses to the 
Court's decisions never questioned the Court but, instead, 
sought to conform to the Court's rulings.102 
98. Lawmakers have not always looked to the courts to settle constitu-
tional issues. See generally NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2004); Devins, supra note 2, at 1342-46, 1349-55 (comparing 
the Warren Court to today's Congress). 
99. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1352. 
100. See supra note 16 (citing articles arguing that the Rehnquist Court 
embraced the rhetoric of judicial supremacy); infra notes 120-27 and accom-
panying text. 
101. See generally Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers 
Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 435-37 
(2001). 
102. See Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 63, 72-74 (2004). 
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Perhaps more striking, recent proposals to strip the courts 
of jurisdiction over same-sex marriage, the pledge of allegiance, 
and other social issues were rhetorical moves in which Republi-
can lawmakers sought to .strengthen ties with their social-
conservative baseJ03 Congress had nciinterest in passing those 
measures. In the 2003-04 Congress, legislators voted on only 
two of those measures-same sex marriage and the pledge of 
allegiance-and they cast those votes in the House shortly be-
fore the November elections, making it impossible for the Sen-
ate to consider the bills before the end of the legislative ses-
sion.l04 In the 2005-06 session, the House voted on only one 
such measure, addressing the pledge of allegianceJ05 
When lawmakers did advocate jurisdiction-stripping pro-
posals on social issues, they often made fiery speeches about 
"activist" judges and the need for Congress to assert its su-
premacy on such issuesJ06 In stark contrast, legislative consid-
eration of a jurisdiction-limiting proposal on enemy combatants 
was extremely deferential to the courts and the supremacy of 
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes and the Con-
stitution. This mismatch between rhetoric and reality suggests 
that Congress has little desire to pressure the Court into adher-
ing to Congress's preferred vision of constitutional truth. Rhe-
torical attacks on the Court are addressed to social conserva-
tives, not the Court. When Congress does address the Court, 
such as through legislation restricting the court's jurisdiction, 
Congress leaves it to the Court to sort out whether to give effect 
to the legislation. 
103. Devins, supra note 2, at 1355-57. 
104. See Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 MD. L. REV. 197, 202-04 (2006). 
105. See 152 CONG. REC. H5396 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (reporting the 
votes cast on the Pledge Protection Act of 2005). The Pledge Protection Act of 
2005 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in August of 2006. 152 
CONG. REC. S8795 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2006). The Senate did not take action be-
fore the end of the legislative session on October 2, 2006. Senators introduced 
several other bills that sought to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction in the 
2005-06 Congress, including legislation on same-sex marriage, the sanctity of 
life, and the Ten Commandments. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1356-57. Aside 
from a judicial review provision in a massive bill dealing with the legal rights 
of undocumented immigrants, however, none of these jurisdiction-altering bills 
was discussed in congressional hearings or on the floor of either the Senate or 
the House. See Memorandum from Svetlana Khvalina to Neal Devins, Court-
Stripping Bills in the 109th Congress (Sept. 17, 2006) (on file with the author). 
106. See Devins, supra note 104, at 201-02; Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the 
Court, AM. PROSPECT, July 3, 2005, at 24, 26. 
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II. A POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY READING OF 
HAMDANV RUMSFELD 
In agreeing to review Hamdan-after the D.C. Circuit had 
backed the Bush administration-the Supreme Court signaled 
its willingness to check the President's prosecution of the war 
on terror.l07 When deciding Hamdan in light of the DTA lan-
guage restricting court jurisdiction, the Court had to sort out 
whether it wanted to do battle with Congress and the execu-
tive. The Court, for example, could have passed judgment on 
the constitutionality of DTA restrictions on court jurisdiction. 
Instead, the Court depicted the DTA as a delegation of power 
from Congress to the Supreme Court-so that the Court acted 
at Congress's behest when determining the legality of military 
commissions and the relevance of the Geneva Conventions to 
enemy combatant trials. 
The remainder of this Essay explains why the Justices de-
cided both to frame the DTA as they did and to repudiate the 
Bush administration's claims about military commissions. This 
explanation focuses on institutional incentives; specifically, the 
Court's desire to protect its turf and maximize its influence 
over the other branches. I will not assess relevant Supreme 
Court precedent to determine whether the Court's interpreta-
tion of the DTA, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 
other statutes was sound.108 Likewise, I will not assess whether 
the Bush administration's legal interpretations regarding mili-
tary commissions served the national interest.109 Rather, this 
Part provides a positive political account of the Hamdan opin-
ion, assuming that Supreme Court Justices have "institutional 
preferences that may enhance or weaken the strength of [their] 
107. The Court's grant of certiorari in Rasullikewise spoke to the Court's 
willingness to defend its turf by checking the President's power. See Linda 
Greenhouse, It's a Question of Federal Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at Al. 
108. The fact that the Court divided five to three on these issues suggests 
that there were two plausible interpretations of the relevant statutes and re-
lated constitutional provisions. Indeed, the Court would have likely divided 
five to four if Chief Justice Roberts had not recused himself from the case. Af-
ter all, Roberts ruled for the administration on these issues when sitting on 
the D.C. Circuit. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
109. Compare JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT 
OF THE WAR ON TERROR passim (2006) (defending the Bush administration's 
stance on military commissions), with Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moor-
ings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L. J . 1199, 1234-44 (2006) (attacking 
executive supremacy in war making and the scholarly writings of John Yoo). 
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ideological preferences"110 and that "[t]he pivotal Justices have 
repeatedly submerged their immediate substantive preferences 
to serve long-term procedural values."111 
Throughout its prosecu.tion of the war on terror, the Bush 
administration has sought to limit, if not nullify, judicial checks 
on the executive. For Justices interested in preserving their 
own authority, these arguments were too much. "It seems 
rather contrary to ail idea of a Constitution with three 
branches," as Justice Breyer put it, "that the executive would 
be free to do whatever they want ... without a check."112 Simi-
larly, with respect to the administration's ability to win in 
court, the swing Justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts-Sandra Day O'Conpor and Anthony Kennedy, respec-
tively-worried openly about the executive's ''blank check" view 
of presidential war-making power.113 
Let me make this point more concretely, starting with 
Bush administration claims about executive branch supremacy 
in war making. The administration was not interested in nar-
row, technical victories. It sought to fence the courts out and it 
was very assertive in its rhetoric. In Rasul, the government did 
not simply argue that the Court was without jurisdiction to 
rule on the legal rights of detainees captured abroad and held 
in Guantanamo Bay (a military base that the United States 
leased from Cuba).114 It claimed that "[t]he Constitution com-
mits to the political branches and, in particular, the president, 
the responsibility for conducting the Nation's foreign affairs 
and military operations."l15 The government, moreover, warned 
the Court that "exercising jurisdiction" over Guantanamo de-
tainees would "strike a serious blow" to the war effort by plac-
ing the judiciary in the "unprecedented position of micro-
110. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive 
Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 783 
(1996). 
111. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's 'Vn-
steady Path':· A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1447, 1491 (1995). 
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) 
(Nos. 03-334, 03-343). 
113. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799-805 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J ., concurring in part); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 509, 535-36 (2004) 
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) . 
114. The brief did make narrow claims about past precedent governing the 
rights of enemy combatants captured and held abroad. See Brief for the Re-
spondents at 13, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). 
115. ld. at 12. 
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managing the Executive's handling of captured enemy combat-
ants."116 
The government's arguments in Hamdan were cut from 
the same cloth. It asked the Court to moot the case, arguing 
that the DTA applied retroactively and thereby stripped the 
Court of jurisdiction.117 On the merits, the government argued 
that the President had inherent authority to establish military 
tribunals and that the decision of whether the Geneva Conven-
tions apply to enemy combatants is "solely for the executive."llS 
At a minimum, "[e]ven if some judicial review of the President's 
determination were appropriate . . . the standard of review 
would surely be extraordinarily deferential to the President."n9 
Needless to say, the government's absolutism would be an 
anathema to a Court interested in protecting its turf. For a 
Court interested in asserting its supremacy on constitutional 
questions, the government's claim would be-if you will-a call 
to arms. The Rehnquist Court was certainly such a Court, and 
there is good reason to think that the Roberts Court (at least 
for now) will follow suit.120 Before turning to the Roberts 
Court's repudiation of executive branch unilateralism in Ham-
116. Id. at 12-13. The government also cautioned against judicial micro-
management in a pair of 2004 cases challenging the government's power to 
detain American citizens designated as enemy combatants. See Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 514; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 428 (2004). Most striking, as 
already noted, is that the government rebuffed questions about military offi-
cers torturing enemy combatants by stating there were real world and legal 
limits on "the method[s] of interrogation that may be employed" and citing 
treaty obligations and the inherent unreliability of information gained through 
overly aggressive interrogation techniques. Transcript of Oral Argument at 
48-50, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696); see also Stevenson, supra note 24 
(noting that the government's claims were misleading and that those claims 
contradicted the Justice Department's torture memo and the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal). 
117. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
118. Brief for Respondents at 38, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). 
119. Id. The government did not simply rely on these broad claims of 
power. It also argued that Congress had authorized military commissions and 
that the language of the Geneva Conventions and relevant judicial precedent 
suggest that the Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda. Id. at 15-20, 38. 
120. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Rehnquist Court's juricentric view of its role). In saying that the Rehnquist 
Court embraced judicial supremacy, I am not arguing that the Court either 
operated outside of the political mainstream or was insensitive to social and 
political forces. See Devins, supra note 102 (explaining how Rehnquist Court 
decisions-even decisions invalidating federal statutes-reflect majoritarian 
social and political forces). 
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dan, a few words about the Rehnquist Court will illustrate this 
point. 
The Rehnquist Court left a legacy of judicial supremacy 
through words and deeds. It invalidated more federal statutes 
than any Court before it121 and, in so doing, reinvigorated fed-
eralism-based limits on Congress,122 Depicting Bush v. Gore as 
an "unsought responsibility," the Court did not blink when re-
solving the 2000 presidential election,123 In reaffirming abor-
tion rights, it condemned state and federal efforts to pressure 
the Court to revisit Roe v. Wade, 124 saying that it was the 
Court's job to bring "the contending sides of a national contro-
versy [together] to end their national division by accepting a 
common mandate rooted in the Constitution."I25 Likewise, 
when rejecting federal efforts to override Supreme Court stan-
dards governing religious liberty, the Court made clear that it 
"will treat its precedents with the respect due them," and that 
Congress and the President should also "respect ... the proper 
actions and determinations of the [Court]."126 The list goes on-
there is near universal agreement about the modern Court's 
embrace of the rhetoric of judicial supremacy.l27 
That the Court had strong incentives to slap down the ex-
ecutive in Hamdan cannot be denied. Beyond executive branch 
unilateralism and the modern Court's view that the resolution 
of all constitutional matters lies within its jurisdiction, the spe-
cific facts of Hamdan also contributed to the Court's decision. 
In particular, the Court is more likely to see the elaboration of 
121. See supra notes 16-18. 
122. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
123. 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). For arguments that judicial hubris underlies 
the Court's very participation in Bush u. Gore, see David A. Strauss, Bush v. 
Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 passim (2001); John 
C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 passim 
(2001); Gerald Gunther, Op-Ed., A Risky Moment for the Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2000, at A37. 
124. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
125. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). This 
contention was largely rhetorical. The Court retreated in Casey by jettisoning 
Roe's trimester framework. See id. at 858. 
126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997); see also Linda 
Greenhouse, Steady Rationale at Court Despite Apparent Bend, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2003, at A22 (noting that the Rehnquist Court embraced judicial su-
premacy even when upholding congressional efforts to expand rights). 
127. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 107; Post & Siegal, supra note 16, at 
2037; Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 1969; Yoo, supra note 123, at 787-88. 
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individual rights as being at the Court's "core power."128 This 
factor is especially important for habeas corpus claims, for-as 
the Court proclaimed in 2001-"the writ of habeas corpus has 
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive deten-
tion, and it is in that context that its protections have been 
strongest."129 Indeed, at oral arguments in Hamdan, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized the importance of habeas corpus relief, 130 
suggesting that limitations on habeas relief would "threaten[] 
the status of the judiciary as a co-equal partner of the legisla-
ture and the executive."131 
Against this backdrop, the Court's repudiation of military 
tribunals in Hamdan was anything but surprising. At the same 
time, Hamdan was not simply an individual rights case; it also 
presented a basic challenge to a key component of the Presi-
dent's war on terrorJ32 The Court is unlikely to stand alone in 
such a case, even if the case does raise fundamental individual 
rights issues. The President sees the "rights of governance in 
foreign affairs and war powers areas" as core executive powers 
and has strong incentives to expand his war-making preroga-
tives.133 Moreover, the stakes are extremely high and the 
Court's capacity to second guess military judgments is ques-
tionable.134 Without the backing of Congress, courts typically 
turn down challenges to presidential war making.135 Even with 
128. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign 
Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation 
of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 306-08 (1993). 
129. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). 
130. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-44, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. 
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). 
131. Alison Holland, Note, Across the Border and over the Line: Congress's 
Attack on Criminal Aliens and the Judiciary Under the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 27 AM. J. GRIM. L. 385, 398 (2000). Justice 
Kennedy's comments at oral arguments emphasized the need for enemy com-
batants to be "tried by a lawful tribunal" and suggested that the denial of ha-
beas relief raised a "structural," not "procedural," question. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 43, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). Accordingly, there is 
reason to think that Justice Kennedy will be skeptical of Congress's prohibi-
tion of habeas claims in the MCA. 
132. See supra notes 7-10, 28-31. 
133. McGinnis, supra note 128, at 306; see also William Michael Treanor, 
Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 
passim (1997) (outlining the debate surrounding the President's power under 
the War Powers Clause). 
134. McGinnis, supra note 128, at 306. 
135. As then appellate judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it: "Congress has 
formidable weapons at its disposal .... 'If the Congress chooses not to con-
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the backing of Congress, the Court would not want to assert its 
supremacy through a holding on the constitutionality of presi-
dential war powers, which would be difficult to reverse.136 
The challenge for the Hamdan Court, therefore, was to 
somehow depict the conflict as one between Congress and the 
President. The Court did not want to rule that the DTA, in fact, 
applied retroactively and that Congress could not strip the 
courts of jurisdiction to rule on the legality of presidentially 
created military commissions and the applicability of the Ge-
neva Conventions to enemy combatant trials. Likewise, the 
Court did not want to rule on the constitutional status of en-
emy combatants, including the authority of Congress to restrict 
habeas rights. 
Hamdan did not speak to these questions. Instead, the 
Court found a way to partner with Congress while, at the same 
time, repudiating broad claims of executive power. First, the 
Court ruled that the DTA did not apply retroactively, and there 
was no need to decide "grave questions about Congress' [consti-
tutional] authority to impinge upon [the] Court's appellate ju-
risdiction, particularly in habeas cases."137 Additionally, the 
Court depicted the DTA as a statute that delegated to the Su-
preme Court the task of sorting out "the very legitimacy of tri-
bunals," while (assuming the Court approved military commis-
sions) channeling "more routine challenges to final decisions 
rendered by those tribunals . . . to a particular court and 
through a particular lens of review."138 Second, the Court high-
lighted Congress's powers to "declare War ... and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water."139 As such it deter-
mined that the decision to constitute military tribunals resides 
front the President, it is not our task to do so."' Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 
770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Goldwa-
ter v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also 
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 98, at 77-83 (discussing the incentives for all 
three branches to seek war powers). 
136. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword, 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (1994) (analyzing the relation-
ship between Congress and the Court). Unlike a statutory ruling, to which 
lawmakers can respond by enacting a new law, a constitutional ruling severely 
constrains lawmakers in their available responses. Such responses might only 
include extremely adversarial and costly techniques like jurisdiction stripping, 
constitutional amendments, and changing the composition of the Court 
through the appointments process. See id. at 42-43. 
137. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006). 
138. Id. at 2769. 
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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with Congress.I40 By contrast, the President has the "power to 
execute," and thereby his inherent authority is limited to the 
"conduct of campaigns."141 Third, the Court further constrained 
the President's power by narrowly interpreting the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and two post-9/11 statutes, 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Forcel42 and the DTA. 
For the Court, none of these statutes gave the President the 
power to convene military commissions or to act outside of his 
obligations to adhere to the law of war, including the Geneva 
Conventions.l43 It did not matter that Congress implicitly 
backed and explicitly recognized the existence of military com-
missions when enacting the DTA.l44 Instead, the Court re-
solved ambiguities in relevant statutes and Court precedents 
against the executive.l45 
In ruling against the executive and trumpeting Congress's 
role, the Court depicted itself as a policeman-possessing juris-
diction to make sure that the executive was acting under con-
gressional authorization but lacking the power to set military 
policy. Hamdan contains no mention of the Court's past narrow 
readings of its own precedents and appears to minimize recent 
congressional efforts to empower the executiye.146 Instead, for 
reasons mentioned above, the Court wanted to shield its deci-
sion by framing Hamdan as a fight between a power hungry 
executive-willing to make policy inconsistent with lawmaker 
preferences while, at the same time seeking to prevent the fed-
eral courts from reviewing this unauthorized power grab-and 
a vulnerable Congress-the branch authorized to make policy 
on military commissions, the Geneva Conventions, and the like. 
To further insulate itself, the Court grounded its decision in 
140. Similarly, the Court cast doubt on the President's power to unilater-
ally convene military tribunals except in cases of "controlling necessity." Ham-
dan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. In this way, the Court sought to limit, without actu-
ally revisiting, its "controversial" approval of military commissions in World 
War II in Ex parte Quirin. See 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942). 
141. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 
139 (1866)). 
142. Id. at 2772-75. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. This is the chief complaint of Julian Ku and John Yoo in their critique 
of Hamdan. See supra note 5; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference 
and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 650 (2000) (positing that deference to 
executive agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes is inappropriate in 
certain contexts). 
146. See supra notes 139-45. 
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congressional statutes and not the Constitution.l47 In this way, 
the Court simultaneously rebuffed the executive and returned 
the enemy combatant issue to elected government. To drive this 
point home, four of the five Justices in the Hamdan majority 
remarked (in a two-paragraph concurring opinion) that "[t]he 
Constitution places its faith in democratic means [rather than 
the unilateral assertions of any one branch]" and that 
"[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Congress to 
seek the authority he believes necessary."l48 
* * * 
For reasons articulated in Part I, the Court could have 
gone much further in Hamdan without risking a political back-
lash from Congress. It could have ruled that the DTA unconsti-
tutionally sought to limit the law's jurisdiction or that the Con-
stitution guarantees that enemy combatants have access to file 
habeas petitions in federal court. Congress almost certainly 
would have acquiesced to such a ruling. My review of the 
MCA's prohibition of habeas corpus filings has revealed that 
surprising conclusion. There was, however, no need for the 
Court to assert itself so forcefully.I49 Hamdan still eviscerated 
the Bush administration's military commission policy and 
guaranteed Geneva Conventions protections to enemy combat-
ants.15o And while Congress responded to the decision by enact-
ing legislation authorizing military commissions and granting 
the executive discretion in interpreting the Geneva Conven-
tions, Congress's actions were hardly predetermined.l51 The 
147. For additional discussion, see infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
148. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (Justices Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined this opinion.). In returning this issue to 
Congress, the Court rejected the government's claim that the President had 
inherent authority to create military tribunals. 
149. On the other hand, it is possible that a majority of the Justices 
thought that Congress could strip the Court of jurisdiction or that the Consti-
tution does not guarantee habeas rights to enemy combatants. In other words, 
it is possible that the Hamdan Court went as far as it could in cabining the 
executive's military commission policy. 
150. See supra notes 45-47. 
151. Early objections to some MCA provisions by Republican Senators 
Warner, McCain, and Graham, for example, could have prompted legislation 
that placed far more limits on the executive than did the final version of the 
MCA. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Charles Babington, Detainee Bill in Final 
Stages, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2006, at A4; Kate Zernike, Crucial Senator Says 
a Few Problems Remain in Bill on Terror Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, 
atAlO. 
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Court remains positioned to strike down the MCA by issuing a 
constitutional ruling on habeas corpus rights. 
From the vantage of positive political theory, the Court 
acted quite sensibly in using Hamdan as a vehicle to protect its 
turf. All constitutional options remain open to the Court. By re-
turning the issue to elected government, the Court's decision 
was hard to condemn as judicial overreaching. Correspond-
ingly, by inviting a democratic response to its decision, the 
opinion gave the White House incentives to accept the Court's 
decision and pursue explicit legislative authorization for its 
policies. By ruling against the executive without explicitly ex-
panding the Judiciary's power (by limiting Congress's power to 
restrict court jurisdiction over pending cases or habeas filings), 
the Court protected itself against executive encroachments 
without exposing itself to political risk. 
Finally, this Essay addresses two related comments-one 
about public disapproval of the Bush administration and the 
other about parallels between Hamdan and Youngstown, espe-
cially the Court's power to check an unpopular President. In 
the winter and spring of 2006---when the Court was crafting its 
opinion in Hamdan-the administration's handling of Hurri-
cane Katrina and the War in Iraq, among other things, con-
tributed to voter disapproval of President Bush.152 With a forty 
percent overall job approval rating,t53 the President did not en-
joy the backing of the American people. Academics and media 
elites likewise did not back the President and they vociferously 
attacked contemporary presidential unilateralism.154 In Ham-
152. See Michael A. Fletcher, President May Be Running Out of Time to 
Rebound, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2006, at A6. 
153. See President Bush-Overall Job Rating in Recent National Polls, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
154. Academics voiced their opinions in writings and amicus briefs. For 
criticism of executive unilateralism in legal publications, see Erwin Chemerin· 
sky, In Guantanamo Case, Justices Rein in Executive Power, TRIAL, Sept. 
2006, at 60, 60 (2006); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of 
Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 702 (2006); Michel Rosenfeld, Ju· 
dicial Balancing in Times of Stress: Comparing the American, British, and Is-
raeli Approaches to the War on Terror, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2079, 2082 (2006). 
For academics opposing the President in Hamdan, see Amicus Brief of Law 
Professor Louis Henkin et al., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-148); Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Louis Fisher in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 8. Ct. 2749 
(No. 05-184); Brief of Law Professors Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rums· 
feld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184); Brief of Military Law Historians, 
Scholars, and Practitioners, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief for 
Richard A. Epstein, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 
126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). In a sampling of seven leading newspapers in-
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dan, academics as well as professional organizations, including 
bar groups and former federal judges, filed briefs defending the 
Court's power to check presidential war making,155 
Against the backdrop of widespread disapproval of the 
President and his policies, the Court had even greater reason to 
rule against the administration. Specifically, the Court often 
takes social and political forces into account, especially the 
views of elites and lawyer groups. 156 This is precisely what hap-
pened in Youngstown: an unpopular president waging an un-
popular war prompted media outrage by advancing arguments 
of executive branch supremacy to justify an unpopular act,157 In 
eluding the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, Wall Street 
Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune and Boston Globe, the Wall 
Street Journal was the only one to back the President's position in Hamdan. 
See, e.g., Editorial, After Hamdan, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2006, at A10. 
155. For a sampling of academic briefs, see supra note 154. Briefs filed by 
professional organizations (opposing the Bush administration) included: Brief 
of Amici Curiae Certain Former Federal Judges in Support of Petitioner, 
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief of the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York and the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar 
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 
(No. 05-184); Brief for the National Institute of Military Justice and the Bar 
Association of the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Brief of the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Peti-
tioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). In addition to lawyer interests, 
briefs supporting Hamdan were filed by former senior U.S. diplomats, retired 
generals and admirals, and current and former members of the U.K. and 
European Union parliaments. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Madeline K. Al-
bright and 21 Former Senior U.S. Diplomats in Support of Petitioner, Ham-
dan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184); Amicus Curiae Brief of Retired Generals 
and Admirals and Milt Bearden in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 
2749 (No. 05-184); Amicus Curiae Brief of 422 Current and Former Members 
of the United Kingdom and European Union Parliaments in Support of Peti-
tioner, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). A group of former attorneys 
general (all Republican), however, did file a brief defending the President. 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Former Attorneys General of the United States, Re-
tired and former Military Officers, and Former Assistant Attorney General in 
Support of Respondents, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184). 
156. See LARENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE 
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR passim (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices 
are influenced by different constituents, including the public, media elites, and 
professional organizations, especially bar organizations); Neal Devins, Ex-
plaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 351-52, 366-69 (2003) 
(noting the lopsided amicus filings in the University of Michigan affirmative 
action case and arguing that the Supreme Court takes into account the views 
of elites, elected officials, and other opinion leaders); see also Devins, supra 
note 98, at 1340-42 (noting how social and political forces shape Court deci-
sion making, especially the decisions of the Court's swing Justices). 
157. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 12, at 77-78. 
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describing Youngstown, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who had 
clerked for Justice Jackson the year the Court decided the case) 
acknowledged that the Court operates against the backdrop of 
social and political forces. For Rehnquist, "[Youngstown] is one 
of those celebrated constitutional cases where what might be 
called the tide of public opinion suddenly began to run against 
the government, for a number of reasons, and ... this tide of 
public opinion had a considerable influence on the Court."158 
Much the same can be said of Hamdan. The Court had a strong 
incentive to protect its turf, and the prevailing social and politi-
cal forces contributed to the Court's willingness to stand behind 
Congress when checking perceived presidential excess, as the 
Court did in YoungstownJ59 
CONCLUSION: PREDICTIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
Let me be clear: Congress (or at least the Congresses that 
enacted the MCA and DTA) does not want the federal courts to 
second guess the military and almost certainly would have pre-
ferred for the Supreme Court to have come out the other way in 
both Rasul and Hamdan. But that desire does not mean that 
Congress is truly upset with the Court, willing to use court-
stripping and other devices to compel the Court to preserve 
Congress's preferred policies. Congress, for reasons detailed in 
this Essay, supports judicial independence and treats Court in-
terpretations of the Constitution as final and authoritative. 
More generally, today's Congress is not especially interested in 
interpreting the Constitution. 
My analysis of the DTA and MCA supports this conclusion. 
Congress certainly sought to limit the judicial role, but it never 
threatened to challenge the Hamdan Court's authority to as-
sert its institutional prerogatives. For this very reason, the 
Court had incentive to hide behind Congress while attacking 
the executive. Unlike Congress, the executive did want to shift 
to itself power that would otherwise reside in the courts. More-
over, even though the DTA backed military commissions and 
called for a limited judicial role, the Court could nonetheless 
158. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT 
Is 95 (1987). 
159. The fact that today's Congress, unlike the Youngstown Congress, tac-
itly backed the President did not matter. The Court needed to find a way to 
isolate the executive from other parts of the government. See supra notes 133-
45. 
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claim that the executive branch was thumbing its nose at Con-
gress without fear that Congress would call its bluff.l60 
The question then becomes: What's next? The MCA will 
soon make its way to the Supreme Court.l61 I expect the Court 
to agree to hear a legal challenge to the MCA, and I predict 
that the Justices will neuter the MCA's habeas provision on 
statutory grounds. The Court passing judgment on the MCA is 
to be expected; after addressing the legal status of enemy com-
batants in Rasul and Hamdan, the Court is too involved in this 
dialogue to step aside at this time (especially considering the 
Court's embrace ofthe rhetoric of judicial supremacy).162 
160. For these and other reasons, the DTA and MCA are not at all incon· 
sistent with my earlier claims that the Court should not fear Congress. See 
Devins, supra note 2, at 1347. Just as recent legislative proposals to strip the 
courts of jurisdiction on social issues are largely rhetorical endeavors, the 
MCA and DTA are not threats to judicial independence. The courts can inter· 
pret these statutes as they see fit and may invalidate key provisions without 
fearing a congressional backlash. See supra notes 81-95. 
161. On February 20, 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld MCA 
limitations on habeas relief by a 2:1 vote. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), and application denied, No. 
06Al001, 2007 WL 1225368 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2007); see Stephen Labaton, Court 
Endorses Curbs on Appeal by U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at Al. 
In upholding the MCA, the two-judge majority concluded that Congress could 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus for "aliens held outside the territory of the 
sovereign." Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
502-05 & n.5 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In so ruling, the majority did not 
consider whether MCA procedures provided an adequate alternative to federal 
court consideration of habeas filings. The dissenting judge did reach this issue, 
concluding both that Congress could not suspend the writ without providing 
adequate alternatives and that the MCA did not provide an adequate alterna-
tive. See id. at 1007 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Following this ruling, lawyers for 
Guantanamo Bay detainees announced their plans to ask the Supreme Court 
to hear an immediate appeal to the ruling. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to 
SCOTUSblog, Detainees to Seek Fast-Track Appeal, http://www.scotusblog 
.com/movabletype/archives/2007 /02/detainees_to_se.html (Feb. 20, 2007, 08:00 
PM). 
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court declined to hear this petition for ex-
pedited review. Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1478. Roughly three weeks later, on 
April 27, 2007, Chief Justice Roberts (ruling in his capacity as supervisory 
Justice of the D.C. Circuit) turned down an appeal for a rehearing of the April 
2 certiorari denial. Boumediene, No. 06Al001, 2007 WL 1225368, at *1. Later 
that very same day, lawyers representing Guantanamo detainees filed peti-
tions for rehearing before the entire Court. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to 
SCOTUSblog, Detainees Seek Rehearing, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
movabletype/archives/2007/04/detainees_seek_2.html (Apr. 29, 2007, 04:51PM). 
For additional discussion, see infra note 162. 
162. See supra notes 16--18, 120-27 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court's practice of asserting its authority to pass judgment on constitutional 
questions). 
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I also think that the Court is too committed to protecting 
its institutional turf, especially habeas corpus jurisdiction, to 
validate the MCA. Indeed, the very factors that animated the 
Court's ruling in Hamdan point to the Court's statutory nullifi-
cation of the MCA's habeas corpus prohibition.163 The Court 
continues to have an incentive to limit executive branch control 
over enemy combatants and, more generally, the war on terror. 
Moreover, Congress would certainly support such a ruling. 
That, for reasons detailed in Part I, was true of the Congress 
that enacted the MCAJ64 It is even more true today; after the 
What then of the Court's April 2, 2007 refusal to hear an expedited appeal 
of a Guantanamo detainee challenge to the Military Commission Act? See in-
ira note 161 (detailing recent Suprt!nle CouJ:t action in Guantiinamo detainee 
appeals). No doubt, the Court is not looking to quickly and decisively intervene 
in this dispute. Justices Kennedy and Stevens (in an opinion concurring in the 
denial of certiorari) concluded that the Court should follow its usual practice 
for ordinary prison inmates and require "the exhaustion of available remedies 
as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of ha-
beas corpus." Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1478 (citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 
114 (1944) (per curiam)). The more difficult question, of course, is whether the 
Court's refusal to hear these appeals signals that Justice Kennedy (the fifth 
vote in Hamdan) is not prepared to overturn the D.C. Circuit decision uphold-
ing Military Commission Act restrictions on habeas relief. See Linda Green-
house, Supreme Court Turns Down Detainees' Habeas Corpus Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A18 (speculating that Justice Kennedy is not yet ready 
to overturn the Military Commission Act). My guess is that Justice Kennedy is 
prepared to issue such a ruling but sees no reason to do so at this time. Con-
gress might moot the case by invalidating the habeas provisions of the Mili-
tary Commission Act. See infra note 168. More than that, the Court might not 
want to open itself to charges of judicial activism and supremacy by expediting 
review of the D.C. Circuit decision. In Hamdan, the Court took pains to pro-
tect itself from such charges-returning the issue to Congress by ruling that 
the military commissions were not statutorily authorized. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 
2754 (2006). Before overturning (or severely limiting Congress's handiwork), 
the Court has good reason to adhere to its normal procedures in habeas cases. 
Indeed, for reasons detailed infra, the Court-even if it were to hear the 
case-might bifurcate its ruling in such a way as to delay ultimate considera-
tion of the legality of military commission procedures. See infra note 168. To 
summarize: While it is hard to know precisely why the Supreme Court refused 
to expedite review of the D.C. Circuit decision, the Court's refusal to quickly 
and decisively determine the legality of MCA restrictions on habeas relief 
hardly means that the Court will not decide this issue at a later date. 
163. See infra notes 169-70. 
164. Today's Congress, of course, would be even more supportive of a Court 
decision invalidating the MCA than the Congress that enacted the statute. By 
shifting control of both the House and the Senate, the November 2006 elec-
tions suggest that Congress and the American people would be even more ac-
cepting of judicial rulings limiting executive branch power. See Barry Fried-
man & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) 
(suggesting that the Court-before striking down a federal statute-pays close 
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2006 Democratic takeover of Congress, a majority of lawmakers 
would welcome judicial invalidation of the MCA's habeas provi-
sion_165 Correspondingly, since the ruling in Hamdan the 
President's popularity has dipped even further166-so that the 
Court has additional slack to check the White House without 
fearing political reprisals. As further support for the Court's 
backing of habeas filings, elites and lawyers' groups oppose the 
MCAJ67 
A statutory, not constitutional, ruling seems likely because 
the Court can rule that enemy combatants possess constitu-
tional habeas rights without invalidating the MCA. Rather 
than engage in open battle with Congress, the Court can con-
clude, as it did in Hamdan, that Congress delegated to it the 
power to determine the reach of statutory habeas corpus. 168 
attention to the Congress in power, not the Congress that enacted a law). 
165. See supra notes 87, 93-95 (noting Democratic opposition to the MCA's 
habeas provision); see also Toobin, supra note 87, at 54 (noting that a Democ-
ratic Congress would not try to countermand a Supreme Court decision invali-
dating the MCA's habeas provision and, as such, "the Court now has plenty of 
running room to do the right thing." (quoting Professor Akhil Reed Amar) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
166. See Peter Baker & Jon Cohen, Doubt Shrouds Bush's Speech; Presi-
dent's Approval Rating Is at Its Lowest Since He Took Office, Hous. CHRON., 
Jan. 23, 2007, at A3. 
167. For example, a brief filed with the D.C. Circuit by seven former fed-
eral court judges, appointed by both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions, argues that the MCA cannot be squared with constitutional habeas cor-
pus, because the "military tribunals may accept evidence obtained by torture." 
Neil A. Lewis, Appeals Court Weighs Prisoners' Rights to Fight Detention, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at Al5 (discussing ongoing litigation in the D.C. Circuit 
challenging the legality of MCA restrictions on habeas filings). For a sampling 
of similar arguments in the Hamdan litigation, see supra note 155. 
168. Alternatively, the Court could avoid (at least temporarily) a ruling on 
the constitutionality of MCA limits on habeas relief by overturning on narrow 
grounds the D.C. Circuit decision upholding the MCA. As discussed above, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress could suspend habeas relief for aliens 
held outside the United States. Supra note 161. In so ruling the D.C. Circuit 
did not consider whether MCA provisions could serve as an adequate alterna-
tive to federal court consideration of habeas filings. See id. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court could overrule the D.C. Circuit on the applicability of habeas 
rights to federal habeas filings. Such a ruling would send the MCA case back 
to the D.C. Circuit. Such a ruling would also provide Congress with an oppor-
tunity to moot the habeas question by passing legislation overturning the 
MCA's limits on habeas filings. Legislation was introduced before the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court's February 20, 2007 ruling, and the D.C. Circuit may well prod Con-
gress to enact this legislation (subject, of course, to a presidential veto). See 
Labaton, supra note 161; Josh White, Bill Would Restore Detainees' Rights, 
Define 'Combatant,' WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007, at AS. This legislation could 
be enacted before any Supreme Court consideration of the D.C. Circuit deci-
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Specifically, the Court can hold that the MCA applies only to 
statutory habeas filings and that enemy combatant habeas fil-
ings, in fact, are protected by the Constitution_I69 Congress, for 
reasons discussed in Part I, would certainly acquiesce to such a 
ruling.170 
Whether my prediction proves correct, my bottom line re-
mains the same: the Supreme Court need not fear Congress. 
Lawmakers have little interest in asserting their power to in-
dependently interpret the Constitution. Attacks on the Court, 
as I argued in these pages last year, are largely rhetorical-not 
heartfelt. And when lawmakers have acted to limit court juris-
diction, they have done so in ways that support judicial inde-
pendence-including the power of courts to nullify jurisdiction-
limiting statutes. That, as this Essay has shown, is the lesson 
ofihe IviCA and DTA. 
sian--especially because the Court has refused to hear the case on a fast track 
basis. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478, denying cert. to 476 
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and application denied, No. 06A1001, 2007 WL 
1225368 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2007). Moreover, if congressional efforts to pass this 
legislation would be frustrated by a presidential veto, a Court decision invali-
dating the MCA would have the formal backing of Congress. 
169. In rendering such a decision, the Court would not need to invoke the 
canon of constitutional avoidance. Instead, the Court could rule that the MCA 
is clearly limited to statutory habeas filings, so that the statute does not call 
upon the Court to sort out Congress's power to restrict constitutional habeas 
corpus. This is precisely what happened in Hamdan. In concluding that Con-
gress did not intend to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Hamdan 
dispute, the Court did not invoke the constitutional avoidance canon. Instead, 
the Court concluded that the DTA statute applied prospectively, and, conse-
quently, there was no need to decide "the manner in which the canon of consti-
tutional avoidance should affect subsequent interpretation of the DTA." Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 n.15 (2006). 
170. The November 2006 elections provide further support for this conclu-
sion, as today's Congress is more likely to back judicial invalidation of the ha-
beas provision than the 2006 Congress. 
